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ESSAY
Proportional Equality:
Readings of Romer
BY NAN D. HUNTER*
ne of the great enigmas of equal protection law is Romer v.
Evans.' In finding sufficient power in the rational basis test to
invalidate a state constitutional amendment enacted by popular
vote, the Supreme Court left legal scholars in its doctrinal dust, puzzled
over the answers to multiple questions. Was this a new rational basis test?
If so, how could one know when to apply it? Had the standard of review for
state acts adversely affecting lesbian, gay and bisexual Americans changed?
If so, to what? Had Bowers v. Hardwick2 been overruled? If so, why?
The Court's decision in Romer has been read in many ways: as "a
culmination of... twenty five years of gay rights advocacy;"3 as "a
shift from thick to thin description [of sexual orientation identities],
from realism to nominalism;" as a harbinger of judicial minimalism;5
as an "uninformed adventure[ ] in judicial activism;" as exemplifying
a new equal protection jurisprudence based on the co-constitutive
nature of rights and classes;7 as a recuperation of the Bill of Attainder
Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).2 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
3Andrew M. Jacobs, Romer Wasn't Built in aDay: The Subtle Transformation
in JudicialArgument over Gay Rights, 1996 WIs. L. REv. 893, 951.
4 Janet E. Halley, Romer v. Hardwick, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 429, 439 (1997).
5 Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARv. L. REV.
6, 53-71 (1996).
6 Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 10
(1998).
7 Julie A. Nice, The Emerging ThirdStrand in Equal Protection Jurisprudence:
Recognizing the Co-Constitutive Nature of Rights and Classes, 1999 U. ILL. L.
REv. 1209.
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clauses;8 as so unprincipled as to be "essentially fraudulent;"9 and as too
singular to mean much of anything."0 If professors graded Justices, Romer
might well receive an incomplete.
Publication of this essay marks the fifth anniversary of the decision,
and thus a preliminary assessment is appropriate. Part I examines the text
and its progeny, concluding that this analytically cryptic decision has been
deeply prolific in some respects, less so in others. Part II identifies what I
believe are the four most important structural components of the Court's
reasoning: the reversal of categorical inequality, the articulation of a nexus
test, the unresolved animus/morality dichotomy, and the silence as to
analogy. For each, I analyze how the emerging body ofjudicial interpreta-
tion of Romer has incorporated or reshaped the underlying concept. Finally,
Part III outlines and critiques at least the preliminary rule of Romer, which
I call proportional equality.
I. ROMER AND ITS PROGENY
A. The Text
In a statewide referendum in 1992, Colorado voters adopted Amend-
ment 2 to the state constitution. Amendment 2 read:
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments,
nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school
districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance
or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct,
practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or
entitle any person or class ofpersons to have or claim any minority status,
quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination.
11
Its effect was to repeal civil rights protections for homosexual and bisexual
Coloradans and possibly bar remedies against failure to enforce laws of
" Akhil Reed AmarAttainderandAmendment2: Romer's Rightness, 95 MICH.
L. REv. 203 (1996).
' Lino A. Graglia, Romer v. Evans: The People Foiled Again by the Con-
stitution, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 409,410 (1997).
10 Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST.
COMMENT. 257 (1996).
" Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996).
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general applicability, when such failures would be challenged as discrimi-
natory on sexual orientation grounds. In addition, by enshrining this
provision in the state constitution, it precluded state or local legislatures
from reinstating these civil rights provisions-only for this group-except
by the process of constitutional amendment.
The Colorado Supreme Court ruled Amendment 2 unconstitutional on
an equality theory, but a very different one from the basis of the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision.12 The state supreme court ruled on political
process grounds, holding that the singling out of gay and bisexual persons
for a far more difficult process for seeking enactment of a civil rights law
was a "fencing out" of a particular minority and unconstitutional for that
reason. 3 Relying chiefly on Hunter v. Erickson,4 in which the Supreme
Court struck down an Akron ordinance requiring referendum approval
before the city could enforce a fair housing law,"5 the Colorado court ruled
that Amendment 2 infringed the fundamental right of homosexual and
bisexual citizens to participate in the political process. 6
The United States Supreme Court never reached those grounds. Instead,
in a decision remarkable for its combination of soaring rhetoric and
slippery doctrine, the Court declared that Amendment 2 was a violation of
the equal protection clause "in the most literal sense."' 7 It based that
holding on two premises.
First, the Court held that the scope and impact of the disability which
it imposed rendered Amendment 2 unlawful. "It is at once too narrow and
too broad. It identifies persons by a single trait and then denies them
protection across the board."'
Second, the Court held that the breadth of the disenfranchisement led
to the "inevitable inference"' 9 that the purpose of it was "a bare... desire
to harm a politically unpopular group."'2 The Court declared that a
classification cannot be solely "for the purpose of disadvantaging the group
burdened by the law."' In light of the Court's subsequent decision in
12 Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1276-82 (Colo. 1993), affd on other
grounds, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
13 Id. at 1282.
14 Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
5Ild at 392-93.
16 Evans, 854 P.2d at 1284-86.
7 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996).
Is Id.
19 Id2
1 Id. at 634 (quoting Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
2 'Id at 633.
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Board of Trustees v. Garrett,' this principle appears to be limited to
findings that hostility was the only or perhaps the dominant purpose of the
law. In Garrett, the Court held that the mere presence of biases as partial
motivations for state decisionmaking "does not a constitutional violation
make."
One striking theme of Romer is the extent to which the Court focused
on the nature of the classification, rather than on the characteristics of the
group being classified. That focus grows directly out of the Courfs
rejection of either the ground upon which the state supreme court ruled or
a heightened scrutiny approach. Consider this framing of Amendment 2
from the state's brief:
[H]omosexuals, like all Americans, deserve equal rights. But nothing
about their circumstances, their lifestyle or their political power rates
them as a group in need of special rights.24
What is clear is that the Court went to some lengths to avoid "rating them
as a group."
Under the traditional heightened scrutiny analysis, a court must
examine the history and characteristics of the group subject to disadvan-
tage. Is there a history of discrimination? Is the defining characteristic
unrelated to merit or eligibility? Is that characteristic immutable? Is the
group weakened or even powerless in the "pluralist bazaar?" Because the
Colorado Supreme Court had once remanded the case for trial on the
SBoard of Trustees v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001).
2 Id at 964. The statement arose in specific rebuttal to Justice Breyer, who had
argued that "[a]dverse treatment that rests upon such motives [as prejudice] is
unjustified discrimination." Id at 971 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Two Justices in the
five-Justice majority also wrestled with the difference between bias and
irrationality in their concurrence: "Prejudice, we are beginning to understand, rises
not from malice or hostile animus alone. It may result as well from insensitivity
caused by simple want of careful, rational reflection or from some instinctive
mechanism to guard against people who appear to be different in some respects
from ourselves.... [P]rejudice [ ] can stem from indifference or insecurity as
well as from malicious ill will." Id at 968 (Kennedy and O'Connor, JJ.,
concurring).
24 Reply Brief of Petitioners at 16, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No.
94-1039) (emphasis added).
' See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Clebume Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439-47
(1985).
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constitutional issues,' there was a full evidentiary record on these very
questions,27 a far richer basis for their consideration than is normally the
case in equal protection litigation. To use the vernacular, however, the
Court simply would not go there.
Moreover, had the Court relied on the grounds on which the Colorado
Supreme Court ruled and on which the plaintiffs placed primary
reliance-the political process theory-that, too, would have led it to
analyze many similar questions. The Court could not have made sense of
its previous precedents in the political process line of cases without
analogizing homosexual and bisexual persons either to racial minorities, as
to whom a provision such as Amendment 2 would be invalid, or to public
housing tenants, as to whom a roughly similar provision had been upheld.2"
Plaintiffs argued that Amendment 2 treated gay and bisexual Coloradans
as an "independently identifiable group," thus bringing it within the zone
of political process theory.29 The state argued that the invalidation of
differential processes within the political realm was limited to situations
where the targeted group was a suspect class.3 Those challenging
Amendment 2 sought to frame the case as about the use of a suspiciously
invidious and tainted mode of classification, while its defenders sought to
force the Court into a focus on the nature of the people who fit into that
class.31
' Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1286 (Colo. 1993), affdon other grounds,
517 U.S. 620 (1996).27 See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Gay Rights Through the Looking Glass: Politics,
Morality and the Trial of Colorado 's Amendment 2, 21 FORDHAMURB. L.J. 1057,
1062 (1994).
' CompareHunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (holdingthat a city charter
amendment preventing city council from implementing any ordinance dealing with
racial, religious, or ancestral discrimination without the approval of a majority of
voters of the city violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment), with James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (upholding amendment
to state constitution requiring a majority vote of approval for proposed low-rent
housing projects).
" Brief for Respondents at 20-21, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No.
94-1039).30 Petitioner's Brief at 11, Romer (No. 94-1039).
31 See Matthew Coles, Equal Protection and the Anti-Civil-Rights Initiatives:
Protecting the Ability ofLesbians and Gay Men to Bargain in the Pluralist Bazaar,
55 OHIO ST. L.J. 563 (1994). Coles was the primary architect of the political
process theory for the initiative cases. An explicit part of that strategy was to
emphasize the classification over the class, which Coles described as the "ifs the
classification, stupid" approach. Id at 567-68.
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The Court took neither path. Its language suggested almostthe opposite
of an inquiry into archaic stereotypes or an historical edifice of prejudice
and discrimination. The Court never alluded to any such history or pattern;
its perspective was thoroughly presentist. The Court wrote as if lesbian and
gay Coloradans had simply been struck by the lightning of Amendment 2.
"Sweeping and comprehensive is the change in legalstatus effected by this
law.... Homosexuals, by state decree, are put in a solitary class.... The
amendment withdraws from homosexuals, but no others, specific legal
protection[s].... "32 A reader from another planet might imagine that "this
law" was the first brush that homosexuals ever had with disadvantageous
state actions. As Janet Halley put it, "if the same discrimination were
inflicted on blondes or burglars, the same conclusion would follow."'33
Any hints to the contrary are oblique and refer to the decision by local
lawmakers to insulate from certain acts of discrimination "an extensive
catalog oftraits," including, inter alia, status attributable to military service
or child custody. 4 In the final four paragraphs of the text, the Court
concludes that "a bare... desire to harm a politically unpopular group"35
was at work. The Court's exposition of "laws of the kind now before us"'
frames them as strange, out-of-the-blue and, more to the rhetorical point,
irrational. Such laws "raise the inevitable inference" of animus.37 "Inevita-
ble" could be an allusion to an historical context and pattern of stratifica-
tion. Here, though, it seems more of a sigh of resignation: what else could
anyone think?
In the Court's own placement of the decision into lines of precedent,
it drew on both the mighty and the minor. The Court's opening invocation
of Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguso38 was the most stunning
rhetorical move in the text, seeming to place Romer in the same category
of gravitas and import.39 The decision is also peppered with citations to
other canonical texts of equal protection: Sweatt v. Painter,' the first
Supreme Court decision to order racial integration;4 Skinner v. Oklahoma
32Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 627 (1996) (emphasis added).
33 Halley, supra note 4, at 441.
34 Romer, 517 U.S. at 629.
311d at 634.
36 1d
37Id.
31 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
39 Romer, 517 U.S. at 623.
40 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
4' Romer, 517 U.S. at 633. The relevant portion cited of Sweatt itself quoted
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948), which prohibited enforcement of
racially-restrictive covenants.
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ex rel. Williamson,42 invalidating criminal laws that imposed unequal
punishment for equivalent acts;43 and Dunn v. Blumstein," ruling that a
state could not deny the right to vote based on status as a new resident.'
Yet the critical linchpin of its ruling that animus alone can never supply a
legitimate government interest is U.S. Dep "t ofAgriculture v. Moreno,' a
decision involving "hippie communes" that has never carried the same
social impact or moral valence as the other cited cases.
Thus, scholars have debated the meaning and import of Romer v.
Evans. It did not overrule the privacy holding of Bowers 7 It did not apply
heightened scrutiny to classifications based on sexual orientation. And it
did not find that the purposes which Colorado asserted lay behind
Amendment 2-the freeom not to associate or the discretion to determine
the most productive allocation of civil rights enforcement resources-were
improper or illegitimate (although it found no rational link between them
and the challenged law).48 Yet, as we shall see, it has triggered a major shift
in the jurisprudence of sexual orientation. Why? Or, more to the focus of
this essay, how?
B. Judicial Readings
Unlike Moreno, the hippie commune case, and City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,49 the leading rational basis decision with bite
prior to Romer, Romer is likely to generate a significant number of progeny
cases that are its direct descendants. By direct descendants, I mean cases
that address the same classification or class at issue in the original case.
Hippie commune cases disappeared with bell bottoms (and unlike bell
bottoms, never returned). The class disadvantaged in Cleburne has had the
opposite social experience, but the same result for equal protection law.
Cleburne involved a group home for mentally retarded persons. Five
years after it was decided, Congress enacted the Americans with Disabili-
42Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
43Romer, 517U.S. at 634. The relevant portion cited of Skinner quoted Yick Wo
v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886), the first recognition that selective
enforcement of a neutral law violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
"Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
4
1 Romer, 517 U.S. at 634.
4 United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
47Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
4 Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.49City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
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ties Act,' which prohibits discrimination based on disability-including
mental retardation-by private as well as public sector actors. Because the
statute is considerably more detailed and stringent in its review of
disability-based classifications than even Cleburne's view of rational basis,
most litigants have invoked statutory grounds when alleging that form of
discrimination. As a result, there are few equal protection cases that one
would characterize as direct descendants of Cleburne.
Sexual orientation discrimination, by comparison, has neither
disappeared nor has it been swallowed up in case law interpreting statutes.
Eleven states, the District of Columbia and many local jurisdictions have
enacted civil rights laws that prohibit sexual orientation as a basis for
discrimination;"1 indeed, the Supreme ,Court has adjudicated two disputes
arising under such laws.52 But there is no federal statute that bars sexual
orientation as a ground for discrimination, and thus equal protection-based
challenges remain, and are likely to continue to remain, a significant source
of litigation. As a result, the body of case law applying Romer to other
instances of anti-gay state actions-what I am calling the direct descen-
dants-is likely to grow.
What has emerged so far is quite mixed. The single governmental
policy of anti-gay discrimination that has led to the greatest number of
equal protection challenges is the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
policy. 3 Those lawsuits began before Romer was decided and continued
until roughly 1999.' They were all decided on the ground of deference to
'0 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336,104 Stat. 327
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 - 12213 (1994)).
51 See, e.g.,CAL.GOV'TCODE §§ 12920,12940 (West Supp. 2001); CONN. GEN.
STAT.ANN. §46a-8 ic (West 1995); HAW.REV. STAT. § 368-1 (1993); MASS. ANN.
LAWS. ch. 151B, § 4(1) (Law. Co-op. 1999); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 363.03,363.12
(West Supp. 2001); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 281.370, 338.125, 610.185, 613.330
(1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 354-A:7, :8 (Supp. 2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
10:2-1, :5-4, :5-12 (West 1993 & Supp. 2000); RI. GEN. LAWS. §§ 28-5-2,28-5-7
(Supp. 1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495 (Supp. 2000); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
111.36 (West 1997); and D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2512 (1999). For a compendium of
the approximately 120 cities and counties with such laws, see WAYNE VAN DER
MEIDE, LEGISLATING EQUALITY: A REvIEw OF LAWS AFFECTING GAY, LESBIAN,
BIsEXuAL AND TRANSGENDERED PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES passim (1999).
2 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); Hurley v. Irish-American
Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
" National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
160, § 571, 107 Stat. 1547, 1670-73 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1994)).
s See, e.g., Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998); Holmes v. Cal.
Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 1997); Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420
(9th Cir. 1997); Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256 (8th Cir. 1996); Thomason v.
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military judgment, a distinction that virtually eliminated Romer from
consideration. Romer appears to have had no impact on either outcome or
reasoning in these cases.
With regard to equal protection cases outside the military context,
however, there has been a profound, although not universal, shift in
outcome. Prior to Romer, only two federal district court decisions, neither
of which was appealed, had found that an anti-gay state action lacked a
rational basis,55 compared to numerous appellate and trial level decisions
that had found the rational basis test satisfied. In finding that a school
district which had fired a teacher perceived to be gay was entitled to
qualified immunity for that act, the Tenth Circuit held that
Examining the case law as it existed in 1988, we do not find a clearly
established line ofauthority proscribing an adverse action against civilian
job applicants based onhomosexual orperceived homosexual orientation.
Although the Hardwick Court did not deal with an equal protec-
tion claim, for qualified immunity purposes we think its holding, and the
general state of confusion in the law at the time, cast enough shadow on
the area so that any unlawfulness in Defendant's actions was not
,'apparent. 7 .
Since Romer, the trend has run in the other direction. A federal district
court denied a qualified immunity defense on the ground that the alleged
anti-gay discrimination occurred after Romer.!' There have been two
adverse federal cases: the Eleventh Circuit upheld the refusal of a state
Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996); Thome v. U.S. Dep't ofDef., 945 F. Supp. 924
(E.D. Va. 1996).
s Doe v. Sparks, 733 F. Supp. 227 (W.D. Pa. 1990); Swift v. United States, 649
F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1986).
s6 High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir.
1990); Dubbs v. CIA, 866 F.2d 1114 (9th Cir. 1989); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d
97 (D.C. Cir. 1987); In re Opinion ofthe Justices, 530 A.2d 21 (N.H. 1987); Baker
v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985); Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist.,
730 F.2d 444 (1984); Buttino v. FBI, 801 F. Supp. 298 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Todd v.
Navarro, 698 F. Supp. 871 (S.D. Fla. 1988); Childers v. Dallas Police Dep't, 513
F. Supp. 134 (N.D.Tex. 1981); Gaylord v. Tacoma Sch. Dist. No. 10, 559 P.2d
1340 (Wash. 1977).
s7Jantz v. Mud, 976 F.2d 623, 629-30 (10th Cir. 1992).
58Zavatsky v. Anderson, 130 F. Supp. 2d 349, 357-58 (D. Conn. 2001).
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attorney general to hire a lesbian staff attorney,59 and the Sixth Circuit
upheld a municipal charter amendment similar to Colorado's Amendment
2.' The Sixth Circuit, however, also reversed a lower court's dismissal of
an equal protection claim challenging an arrest apparently motivated by
anti-gay bias.6" In addition, the Seventh Circuit recognized an equal
protection claim by a gay student based on a rational basis test.62 District
courts have used Romer reasoning to rule in favor of gay plaintiffs in cases
involving employment of gay teachers,63 harassment of gay students," and
harassment of a gay government employee.'
Of course, it is far too simple to attribute all change to Romer. Given
how vague that decision is, one could as easily postulate that a trend toward
finding that anti-gay state actions are irrational reflects broad but unsystem-
atic changes in public attitudes toward homosexuality.' Indeed, four state
appellate courts have ruled since 1996 that distinctions based on sexual
orientation trigger heightened scrutiny under various provisions of their
state constitutions.67 To some degree, Romer's reasoning merely reflects the
59Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (1 1th Cir. 1997).
0 Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289 (6th
Cir. 1997). In an unusual memorandum accompanying the denial of certiorari,
Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg noted that such a denial is not a decision on
the merits, and attributed the denial in this case to "confusion over the proper
construction of the city charter,"coupled with the Court's practice of"not normally
mak[ing] an independent examination of state law questions that have been
resolved by a court of appeals." Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of
Cincinnati, 525 U.S. 943, 944 (1998), denying cert. to 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir.
1997).
61 Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub
nom. City of Florence v. Chipman, 523 U.S. 1118 (1998).62Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996).
63Weaver v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (D. Utah 1998); Glover v.
Williamsburg Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (S.D. Ohio 1998).
' Montgomery v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 709, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (D. Minn.
2000).
6 Quinn v. Nassau County Police Dep't, 53 F. Supp. 2d 347 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
"Several such markers were noted by Justice Stevens in his dissent in Boy
Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 663 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
67Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (common benefits clause); Lawrence
v. Texas, 2000 WL 729417 (Tex. App. 2000) (sex discrimination), rev'd, 2001 WL
265994 (Tex. App. 2001); Tanner v. Or. Health Sci. Univ., 971 P.2d435 (Or. App.
1998) (equal privileges and immunities); Baehr v. Miike, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw.
Cir. Ct. 1996) (recognition of heightened scrutiny in dicta), af'd, 950 P.2d 1234
(Haw. 1997).
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extent to which society as a whole had begun to question the legitimacy of
anti-gay practices. On the other hand, it seems silly to deny that by
amplifying that skepticism in Romer, the Supreme Court shifted the
weighty thumb of state power on the discursive scale in a fundamental way.
II. THE STRUCTURAL COMPONENTS OF ROMER REASONING
One of the paradoxes of the Court's decision in Romer is the contrast
between the simplicity of what we understand as the normal rational basis
test and the complications of the Court's deployment of it in the opinion.
Although the Court speaks in somewhat simplistic language-referring, for
example, to Amendment 2 as a "literal" violation of the equal protection
clause--that simplicity is misleading. Romer's reasoning is multidimen-
sional, not linear, in the way that it alters the logic of equal protection
analysis. There is no one key to understanding its impact on sexual
orientationjurisprudence. Its impact derives from four inter-related aspects
of its reasoning.
A. The Reversal of Categorical Inequality
It used to be that every analysis of sexual orientation law began with
Bowers v. Hardwick.69 It often ended there as well. The most important
result of Romer v. Evans was that it reversed the shadow holding of
Bowers.
In Bowers, the Court ruled that the fundamental right of privacy did not
protect private consensual acts of oral or anal sex when engaged in by
homosexuals." The Court was silent as to the reach of the law when
heterosexuals engaged in the same acts, at least outside of marriage.
Because no fundamental right was at issue, the Court then assessed the
validity of the Georgia sodomy statute by use of a rational basis test and
held that Georgia's expressed position that "homosexuality" was immoral
constituted a sufficient rational basis.71 The majority evidenced no
discomfort in its analytic slippage, such that the Court moved from
analyzing "sodomy between consenting adults in general, or between
homosexuals in particular,"' to, ultimately, "homosexuality."
6 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996).69 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
701 d at 195-96.
71 Ia at 196.
72Id. at 190.
73 Id. at 196.
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Despite the absence of an explicit equal protection analysis or holding
in Bowers,74 lower federal courts read it as a presumption in favor of state
actions penalizing lesbians and gay men.!5 The logic of these decisions,
restated vigorously by Justice Scalia in hisRomer dissent,76 was persuasive.
Under Bowers, homosexual sexual conduct could be criminalized. When
the state used a sexual orientation classification, homosexual sexual
conduct was "the conduct that define[d] the class," as the D.C. Circuit held
in a decision upholding the dismissal of a lesbian FBI agent.' If a
government could sentence persons in that class to imprisonment because
of their sexual conduct, surely it could also deny them any positive
benefits, such as jobs, based on their membership in that conduct-defined
class. It appeared to be a simple application of the principle that the greater
penalty of criminalization necessarily includes the lesser one of civil
penalties.7"
Federal courts after Bowers and before Romer read Bowers this way.79
Consider the 1988 dissenting opinion of Ninth Circuit Judge Reinhardt in
the panel decision in Watkins v. United States. ° Despite his disagreement
with Bowers, Reinhardt concluded that heightened scrutiny could not be
applied to classifications based on sexual orientation and that the rational
basis standard did not invalidate the military's policy of excluding gay
persons.8 ' Reinhardt felt compelled by its logic to conclude that Bowers
was a case "about 'homosexuality,' "not "about 'sodomy.' "' "The anti-
homosexual thrust of Bowers, and the Court's willingness to condone anti-
' The Court did not actually write anything about the impact of its decision on
equal protection analysis, other than a footnote observing that no equal protection
issues were before it. Id at 196 n.8.
7 See infra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
76 Romer, 517 U.S. at 640-43 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
I Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
7' Lynn Baker has pointed out that this proposition is not as self-evident as it
first appears. Lynn A. Baker, The Missing Pages ofthe Majority Opinion inRomer
v. Evans, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 387,389 (1997).
79 E.g., High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. See. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563,
571 (9th Cir.1990); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989);
Padula, 822 F.2d at 103; Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed.
Cir. 1989).
90 Watkins v. United States, 837 F.2d 1428, 1451 (9th Cir. 1988) (Reinhardt,
J., dissenting).
81 Id at 1455.
82 Id at 1452.
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homosexual animus in the actions of the government, are clear." 3 Had
Romer been the law in 1988, Reinhardt could not have reached the same
conclusion.
Under the pre-Romer approach, any state could single out lesbians and
gay men and treat them as presumptive felons. Thus, it did not seem like
much of a stretch to argue that a state could, if it wished, erect a bar against
extending civil rights protections to that same group of persons. This was
much less severe than criminalization, and it targeted the same group. Ipso
facto, Amendment 2 was constitutionally permissible, at least on a facial
equal protection claim.
The Bowers era of categorical inequality (as opposed to the Hardwick
ruling on substantive due process) ended when the Court ruled that
Amendment 2 could not survive even a rational basis test." But because the
Romer Court did not even mention Bowers, much less analyze its reason-
ing, the Romer dissenters were given a free pass to argue that the majority
had ignored controlling precedent.' Sympathetic commentators also were
left to guess at how to read the two decisions in tandem, resorting to
attempts to write "the missing pages" that the Romer majority failed to
include."
The gap in reasoning does weaken the persuasive power of the
decision. But one problem facing the Romer majority was that it drew
partly from the logic of one of the Bowers dissents. Whether it was done
consciously, I obviously cannot say. But the dissent of Justice Stevens in
Bowers," read together with his articulation of a meaningful rational basis
test in Cleburne,8 pre-figures the reasoning of Romer.
In Bowers, Stevens had argued that the question before the Court was
essentially one of selective enforcement of a generally applicable sodomy
law. First he made the seemingly self-evident point that the class of citizens
being disadvantaged had the same interest in liberty rights as other
citizens." Given that, "[a] policy of selective application must be supported
by a neutral and legitimate interest--something more substantial than a
habitual dislike for, or ignorance about, the disfavored group."9 By
83Id at 1453.
u Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).85Id at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
" See, e.g., Baker, supra note 78, at 389; Sunstein, supra note 5, at 68-69.
SBowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,214 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
City ofClebume v. Clebume Living Ctr.,473 U.S. 432,452 (1985) (Stevens,
J., concurring).
89 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 218.
10Id at219.
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examining the inconsistency and illogic of Georgia's enforcement, he
concluded that morality could not satisfy that test.
In Cleburne, Justice Stevens, joined by then Chief Justice Burger,
expressed his belief that the three-tiered system of suspect, intermediate
and rational basis review misconstrued equal protection analysis.9 In truth,
he said, the Court seeks to "apply a single standard in a reasonably
consistent fashion." 2 The difference between the always fatal outcome
under strict scrutiny and the sometimes fatal outcome under intermediate
review occurred "because the characteristics ofthese [intermediate review]
groups are sometimes relevant and sometimes irrelevant to a valid public
purpose, or, more specifically, to the purpose that the challenged laws
purportedly intended to serve."' Stevens found that the zoning decision at
issue in that case failed a rational basis test, when that test was properly
applied. 4
The Stevens philosophy of equal protection led to his refusal in Bowers
to award a blanket imprimatur for anti-gay practices and to his articulation
in Cleburne of the basis for the meaningful rational basis test later used by
the Court in Romer. Drawing so heavily from a dissent without reversing
the prior decision seems illogical, but, in fact, it was not. The key is that
Stevens was dissenting from the Bowers Court's shadow holding on equal
protection, not from its substantive due process holding. (The substantive
due process dissent in the case was written by Justice Blackmun; the
dissent of Justice Stevens did not address the scope of the privacy right
except in equality terms.) But citing Stevens as a major source of the
majority's reasoning presumably would have forced Justice O'Connor, who
had joined the majority in Bowers, off the majority in Romer, and might
also have troubled Justice Kennedy, who wrote Romer but was not a
member of the Court at the time of Bowers.9'
The impact of the reversal of the categorical inequality reasoning that
Bowers generated has been dramatic. Since Romer, three governmental
actors have attempted to invoke categorical inequality tojustify discrimina-
91 City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 452.
' Id (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 (1976) (Stevens, J., con-
curring)).
931d at 454.94 1d at 455.
" Nor can one assume how Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer-all of
whom joined the Court after Bowers-would have ruled on the questions presented
in Bowers, although it is now evident from the dissent they joined in Dale that they
hold it in low regard. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 663 (2000)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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tory acts, and in all three cases, the defense has been rejected.' Moreover,
the phrase that conveyed the heart of that approach--"'the conduct that
defines the class"--has disappeared from the case law. Since Romer, not
a single court has quoted it, or cited the decision in which it was used, in
support of the "greater includes the lesser" proposition for justifying anti-
gay actions.
B. The Nexus Test
In jettisoning the categorical inequality logic, the Romer Court
substituted anexus test. Although the predictive value of homosexual status
as an indicator of the likelihood of engaging in homosexual conduct still
stands, the Court rescinded the power of the conduct to define the
classification, if not the class. Put another way, the class-defining conduct
justifies the classification only with respect to that conduct. The Court held
that it would "insist on knowing the relation between the classification
adopted and the object to be obtained."97 It is this nexus between means and
ends that "gives substance to the Equal Protection Clause."98
Thus, under Romer, the interest of the state in regulating conduct
circumscribes the authority to classify by bounding the resulting classifica-
tory discretion to laws that directly relate to that prohibitable, i.e., sexual
conduct. When other conduct is being regulated, the state cannot continue
to simply invoke its purpose for criminalizing the sexual conduct. Laws that
regulate the group of persons who engage in X activities, when they engage
in Y activities, must have an independent, Y-related justification. Smokers
may not have a constitutional right to engage in smoking, but they cannot
be fired from their jobs as schoolteachers because they do.
All post-Romer case law to date has accepted this nexus test. Even the
two courts that have upheld anti-gay acts also found that the nexus test was
satisfied. The Eleventh Circuit acceded to the test rather than endorsing it,
but it nonetheless ruled that there was a direct link between the public's
reaction to an attorney representing the state who engaged in conduct
prohibited by state law and the operation of the attorney general's office.
9 Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 873 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied
sub noma. City of Florence v. Chipman, 523 U.S. 1118 (1998); Montgomery v.
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 709, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (D. Minn. 2000); Tester v. City
of New York, 1997 U.S. Dist. Lexis 1937, at *19-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
97 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).9 Id
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That link sufficed to justify revoking that specific job offer.' The Sixth
Circuit ruled that an amendment to Cincinnati's City Charter hada "direct,
actual, and practical" relationship to voter concerns about the expenditure
of city funds for enforcement of anti-discrimination ordinance provi-
sions covering sexual orientation." ° The court distinguished this from the
same rationale offered and rejected as support for the Colorado provision
at issue in Romer, on the ground that the statewide voters there could not
rationally be concerned with the consequences of the municipal laws that
were being repealed, which were being enforced solely by municipal
agencies. T
Other courts have taken the principle farther. The district court in
Weaver v. Nebo School District overturned the reassignment of a lesbian
coach because the school board did not offer a 'job-related justification"
for its action."2 The court found that defendants had not "demonstrated
how Ms. Weaver's sexual orientation bears any rational relationship to her
competency as teacher or coach, or her job performance as coach."' 3
The court specifically rejected the defendant's argument that their
concern about the negative reaction of some parents to the presence of a
lesbian coach supplied the necessary nexus. The court held that "[i]f the
community's perception is based on nothing more than unsupported
assumptions, outdated stereotypes, and animosity, it is necessarily
irrational," and under Romer cannot provide a legitimate basis for the
action.' 4 The power of the nexus test in this case is especially dramatic
because the locale was a public school district in Utah, a state with a
sodomy law essentially identical to the one upheld in Bowers. 5
" Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1110 (1 th Cir. 1997). The court framed
this as a status-conduct distinction rather than a nexus test. That distinction also
grew out of Bowers. See Cammermeyer v. Aspin, 850 F. Supp. 910, 918 (W.D.
Wash. 1994). It has not survived in other post-Romer case law, however.
100 Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnativ. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 300
(6th Cir. 1997).
'o' Id
10 2 Weaver v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1289 (D. Utah 1998).
10 3 Id.
104 Id.
0-5 CompareUTAHCoDEANN. § 76-5-403 (1999), with GA. CODEANN. § 16-6-
2 (1984). The Georgia statute, insofar as it criminalizes private, unforced,
noncommercial sexual acts between consenting individuals, was found
unconstitutional by the Georgia Supreme Court, relying on the right of privacy in
the state constitution. Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998).
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A district court in Ohio ordered reinstatement of a gay teacher after
finding that the board's reasons for firing him were pretextual and that the
true reason was his sexual orientation."° There the defendant argued that
the decision was based on other reasons, but it also asserted that the
"tensions and hostilities" that would develop because of moral objections
to homosexuality could impair a gay teacher's ability to function and, thus,
would supply a rational basis for firing him."0 7 The court did not accept that
as a legitimate rationale because the teacher "had established that he was
an above average first-year teacher who was more qualified than the
woman chosen by the Board to replace him." ' Again, the court required
a specifically job-related rationale.'09
It is likely that the criteria for a nexus will be drawn more tightly by
some courts than by others. So far, at least, outside the context of criminal
prohibitions, morality has not sufficed. The logic previously derived from
Bowers-that because morality sufficed to justify criminalization, it would
suffice for other and lesser penalties-has been discarded.
C. The Animus-Morality Dichotomy
The third remarkable ingredient of the Romer decision was its
willingness to classify a penalty directed at lesbians and gay men as
evidence of animus rather than of morality. In other words, in addition to
discrediting morality as the justification for a particular action of the state
because there was an insufficient nexus between moral concerns and the
object of that state practice, the Court was also willing to characterize at
least some condemnation as animus rather than morality at all."°
It was perhaps this aspect of the decision, more than any other, that
drove Justice Scalia to a furious dissent, He resented the implication that
animus toward homosexuality is "unAmerican,'. drawing the traditional
distinction between sin and sinner. No person should be hated, he argued,
"[b]ut I had thought that one could consider certain conduct reprehensible
... Surely that is the only sort of 'animus' at issue here: moral disapproval
" Glover v. Williamsburg Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1174
(S.D. Ohio 1998).
107Id at 1174 n.23.
108 Id. at 1174.
109 Id
110 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,632 (1996).
"' Id at 644 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
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of homosexual conduct.""1 2 If that is true, then all Amendment 2 did was
"prohibit[ ] favored statusfor homosexuality.""..3
Justice Scalia raises fair questions. Is there no distinction between
"animus" and "morality" except the value judgments of a given court?
Justice Scalia argued that no principled basis existed for the Court to
disallow morality as a legitimate state interest in this case when it had
accepted it in others."' Moreover, the Court has continued since Romer to
accept morality as sufficient justification for criminal laws. 15 In Scalia's
view, the decision was ultimately grounded in nothing more than a
transformation in attitudes abouthomosexuality among the cultural elite." 6
This problem is not new to equal protection theory. Noting that "[o]ne
person's 'prejudice' is, notoriously, another's 'principle,' "117 Bruce
Ackerman observed that "[t]he difference between the things we call
'prejudice' and the things we call 'principle' is in the end a substantive
moral difference." ' Cass Sunstein described the term "prejudice" as "a
conclusion masquerading as an analytic device... The claim of irrational-
ity disguises the necessary moral argument."119
Reading the majority and the dissent reinforces the impression of a
zero-sum game, if not a sleight of hand. Animus and morality exist in the
text of Romer as a dichotomous name game. A court will elect to "find" one
or the other. They are mutually exclusive labels for the same set of beliefs.
Although I might prefer to declare that Justice Scalia got it right insofar
as he interpreted the meaning of the Court's decision to be that "traditional
moral values" had been relabeled as animus and thus largely eliminated as
an acceptable justification for anti-gay laws, I do not read the decision so
broadly. When the majority condemned "a bare.., desire to harm a
politically unpopular group" as always constituting animus and never
supplying a legitimate justification for a law, 120 it merely identified as
112 Id
113Id.
114 Id at 644-49.
"' See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 120 S. Ct. 1382, 1402 (2000).
16 Romer, 517 U.S. at 652.
"'7 BruceA. Ackerman, BeyondCarolene Products, 98 HARV.L.REv. 713,737
(1985).
"Id at 740.
"9 Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND. L.J. 1, 4-5
(1994).
120 Romer, 517 U.S. at 634 (quoting U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528,534 (1973)).
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improper the most extreme manifestation of opprobrium. When Justice
Scalia defended Amendment 2 as "designed to prevent piecemeal deteriora-
tion of the sexual morality favored by a majority of Coloradans,"'' he
sought to identify a different legislative purpose: deterring homosexuality.
The Court left unanswered whether harm and deterrence are meaningfully
different. One could argue that there is also a third possible purpose behind
actions of the state, arguably different from either of those two: the
promotion or privileging of heterosexuality.
Romer neither accepts nor rejects deterrence and privilege as legitimate
purposes of the state. Rather, it focuses on the breadth of the impact of
Amendment 2 as the telltale sign of the desire to harm, rather than to
discourage or reward." For such a wide-ranging disadvantageous law to
be so concentrated on this one group, the Court says, is to impose second-
class citizenship, something contrary to our traditions as well as our law."
For Scalia, such a law operates merely as deterrence of "the conduct that
defines the class." 24 For the majority, its excessiveness crosses the line
from deterrence into, as Scalia would deny it, spite.
By recognizing that Amendment 2 imposed penalties on a group, the
Court implicitly accepted that there was a group identity or status that
existed independently of the conduct in which members of the group
presumably engage. This acceptance in itself refutes the totalized approach
of letting the conduct (completely) define the class. The logic of the
decision goes one step farther, however. The Court's logic flips the
question; the most relevant aspect of the conduct versus status debate
becomes not how gay people are defined, but what the law being chal-
lenged seeks to target. "Conduct versus status" becomes a question to ask
about the legitimacy of the law, not of the group. If the law directly
prohibits conduct, it may well stand, so long as Bowers stands. If its aim is
to disadvantage the group, however, it cannot rely for its justification on
conduct that is only indirectly discouraged.
Put differently, the state can encourage or discourage specific conduct
of many sorts, whether what is universally decried, for example, physical
assault, or what is widely accepted, for example, abortion." But govern-
ment cannot denigrate citizens based on their membership in social
121 Id at 653.
122 See id at 627-31.
m Id at 633.
l24Id at 641.
" See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193-94 (1991).
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groups. 6 Whether the effect is deterrence or promotion, there must be
some rational end to the state's policy independent of disapprobation
toward a group of persons.
The lower courts have yet to grapple with this problem because most
cases to date have concerned claims growing out of actions directed against
individuals because of their sexual orientation, rather than challenges to
formal classifications embodied in legislation. Several of the cases have
involved incidents of violence or harassment, for which hostility toward
lesbians and gay men seems to have been intrinsic.'27 As the Sixth Circuit
put it, since "the desire to effectuate one's animus toward homosexuals can
never be a legitimate governmental purpose, a state action based on animus
alone violates the Equal Protection Clause."' 28 By contrast, the same court
also said, "almost every statute [including a formal classification] can be
shown to have some conceivable rational basis, thereby surviving an equal
protection challenge unless it is shown to discriminate against a group
accorded heightened scrutiny."'2
A challenge to a same-sex only sodomy law based on the equal
protection clause would test the logic of Romer by applying it to a statute
prohibiting conduct, but utilizing a classification based solely on status.
Although such a statute would be far narrower in its impact than Amend-
ment 2-imposing no broad swath of disabilities "across the board"--it
would present a sexual orientation classification in its starkest, most
irrational form. Such laws selectively punish one group of persons as
against another when the conduct in which they engage is the same.'
26 One can also express this idea as either a rejection of second-class citizen-
ship, see Sunstein, supra note 5, at 63; or as a rejection of "the view that some
citizens have less value as persons than others," see Joseph S. Jackson, Persons of
Equal Worth: Romer v. Evans and the Politics of Equal Protection, 45 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 453, 499 (1997).
127 Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. deniedsub
nom. City of Florence v. Chipman, 523 U.S. 1118 (1998); Nabozny v. Podlesny,
92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996); Montgomery v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 709, 109 F.
Supp. 2d 1081 (D. Minn. 2000); Quinn v. NassauCounty PoliceDep't, 53 F. Supp.
2d 347 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
"2 Stemler, 126 F.3d at 873-74.
129 Id. at 874.
131 Such laws arguably constitute another literal violation of the equal protec-
tion clause, which at a minimum guarantees "the protection of equal laws." Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,369 (1886). See also Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (holding that state could not impose sterilization
on persons convicted of three felonies by counting grand larceny but excluding
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Apre-Romer decision grounded in the equal protection provision of the
Kentucky state constitution illustrates what would be the analysis. The
Kentucky Supreme Court accepted that "all sexual activity between
consenting adults outside of marriage violates our traditional morality. The
issue here is not whether sexual activity traditionally viewed as immoral
can be punished by society, but whether it can be punished solely on the
basis of sexual preference."'' Noting that "[w]e do not condone the
immorality of such activity,"'3 the court nonetheless found the statute
unconstitutional on the ground that the sole legislative purpose of the
classification was "to single out homosexuals for different treatment for
indulging their sexual preference by engaging in the same activity
heterosexuals are now at liberty to perform."'33
A Texas appeals court, however, sidestepped Romer entirely in
upholding a same-sex sodomy law. In Lawrence v. State, the court limited
the holding of Romer to the principle that laws creating greater burdens on
the efforts of one group of citizens to seek enactment of anti-discrimination
laws violated the equal protection clause.' The court found that Romer
"provide[d] no support" for the challenge to the Texas statute because,
unlike Amendment 2, the sodomy law did not "encumber [plaintiffs'] right
to seek legislative protection from discriminatory practices." '35
No other court has read Romer so narrowly.'36 Given the further appeal
of the Texas case, and the existence of other same-sex sodomy statutes in
states where challenges are underway or possible,'37 it seems likely that this
embezzlement, another felony involving theft, from the necessary count).
"' Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487,499 (Ky. 1992).
'32 1d at 501.
133 Id.
134 Lawrence v. State, 2001 WL 265994, at *4 (Tex. App. 2001).
135 d
136 By contrast, the dissent in Lawrence found Romer to be dispositive. Id. at
*22.
'37 For announcement of the appeal in Lawrence, see http://www.lambdalegal.
org/cgi-bin/pages/documents/reords.?record=807. Other states with same-sex only
sodomy statutes are Arkansas, Kansas, and Missouri. ARK. CODEANN. § 5-14-122
(Michie 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.090
(West 1999). The Arkansas statute is currently being challenged; atrial court found
it unconstitutional under the Arkansas state constitution. Picado v. Jegley, No. CV
99-7048, Cir. Ct. Pulaski Cnty., Ark. 6th Div. (Mar. 23, 2001). An intermediate
appellate court upheld the Kansas statute. City of Topekav. Movsovitz, No. 77,372
(Kan. App. 1998) (unpublished). A mid-level appellate court in Missouri declared
that state's statute unconstitutional. State v. Cogshell, 997 S.W.2d 534 (Mo. Ct.
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category of cases will provide a continuing body of interpretation of Romer
generally and of the specific question of whether the equal protection rule
in that case will, in practical terms, overturn the rule of Bowers v. Hardwick
in at least some sodomy challenges.
D. Silence as to Analogy
"In holding that homosexuality cannot be singled out for disfavorable
treatment," Justice Scalia wrote in his Romer dissent, "the Court... places
the prestige of this institution behind the proposition that opposition to
homosexuality is as reprehensible as racial or religious bias.' 38
Scalia's protestation implicitly alludes to footnote 4 in Carolene
Products, the famous dictum in which the Court said that its normal
deference to legislative enactments would be suspended if laws "directed
at particular religious, or national, or racial minorities" were tainted by
"prejudice against discrete and insular minorities.' 39
Given the profound impact of race on American law and of American
law on building the structures of racial subordination, it is no surprise that
the benchmark for the most stringent equal protection scrutiny is race. Thus
the comparison to race when any other group seeks greater anti-
majoritarian protection from the judiciary is inevitable. The Supreme Court
has compared to racial discrimination the experiences of other groups to
whom it has extended a heightened form of scrutiny of the characteristic
marking the group, for example, gender's" and illegitimacy.'41
Under rational basis review standards, however, there is no need for the
comparison. Eliminating the comparison has a particular resonance for
sexual minorities that it does not have for other non-racial minorities who
might also seek heightened review. The civil rights movement seeking
racial equality was heavily grounded in the religious community. Many
movement leaders (both African-American and white) were members of the
clergy. 42 In addition, political as well as religious leaders embraced
App. 1999). In addition, Oklahoma has a sodomy statute that, as enacted, covers
both opposite-sex and same-sex acts, but which has been limited by judicial
interpretation to the latter. Post v. State, 715 P.2d 1105 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986).
'38Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
"3 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 nA (1938).
'4 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973).
'41 Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175-76 (1972).
'42 See, e.g., DAvID J. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING,
JR. AND THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 97 and passim
(1986); NATIONALRESEARCH COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL
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equality as an openly moral claim. Opponents of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
protested that it was an attempt to "legislate morality" by declaring which
social mores were right and which were wrong." Because of these
associations, one reason underlying resistance to extending equal rights to
a sexual minority is that it is a sexual minority.
The tension between gay rights arguments and the analogy to race rose
to a new level of prominence in 1993.'" During that year's debate over the
military's policy of excluding homosexuals, contestation over this analogy
sharpened significantly, in part because gay advocates invoked the example
of President Truman's executive order desegregating the military in 1948
as their primary precedent and in part because of the central role played by
General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.4 ' Powell
virtually embodied African-American pride, and his rank symbolized the
hard-won recognition of "masculine" virtues in African-American men.
Thus he was an especially powerful advocate for the view that race and
sexual orientation are fundamentally different, not analogous.
The correctness of this particular analogy continues to generate strong
debate and critiques of the various positions." Its complex cultural
reverberations might well make many judges hesitant to declare a winner.
The Romer Court's use of a rational basis test, with its accompanying
SCIENCESANDEDUCATION,ACOMMONDEsTNY:BLACKSAND AMERICAN SOCIETY
(Gerald David Jaynes and Robin M. Williams, Jr., eds.) 173-76 (1989); and
TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954-63,
3, 575, 737-42, 785, 879 (1988).
,43 LESLE A. CAROTHERS, THE PUBLIC AcCOMMODATIONs LAW OF 1964:
ARGUMENTS, IsSUEs AND ATrITUDES INA LEGAL DEBATE 67-69 (1968).
I" E.g., Lena Williams, Blacks Reject Gay Rights Fight As Equal to Theirs,
N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1993, at Al.
4'Devon W. Carbado, BlackRights, GayRights, CivilRights: The Deployment
ofRace/Sexual Orientation Analogies in the Debates about the "Don 'tAsk Don't
Tell" Policy, in BLACK MEN ON RACE, GENDER AND SEXUALITY 283 (Devon W.
Carbado ed., 1999).
'1 See, e.g., Janet E. Halley, Gay Rights and Identity Imitation: Issues in the
Ethics ofRepresentation, in THE POLTICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 115
(David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998); Daren Lenard Hutchinson, "Gay Rights"for
"Gay Whites"?: Race, Sexual Identity, and Equal Protection Discourse, 85
CORNELL L. REv. 1358 (2000); Margaret M. Russell, Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual
Rights and "The Civil Rights Agenda," 1 AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y REP. 33 (1994);
Jane Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States: Decoding the Discourse
of Equivalents, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 283 (1994).
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mooting of the question of analogy, took the "race versus sexuality" debate
out of equal protection law, at least for the moment.
III. PROPORTIONAL EQUALrrY
Together, the four structural components of the Court's reasoning in
Romer have produced whatI will call the principle of proportional equality.
It is not a new test or an additional tier in equal protection jurisprudence.
I would describe it as a metric that is implicit under any of the existing tests
but which is most sharply revealed in judicial logic when it does not
coincide with either strict or heightened scrutiny.
Romer may seem radical, but that is largely because of the radicalism
of the categorical inequality rule that preceded it. It is better read as
reasserting a basic sense of proportionality in the assessment of classifica-
tions that fall outside the economic realm, where the greatest judicial
deference attaches, but which also do not match the traits for which the
Court has formally declared heightened or suspect scrutiny. A classification
that is extreme in the weight of the penalty that results or in the degree of
disconnection between it and the legislature's or agency's legitimate
purpose must be examined with great care.
Its strength is, of course, its shortcoming. It is vague or flexible,
depending on your taste. One cannot be sure of the kinds of discriminatory
practices for which it will be an important part of the analysis. It quite
plainly applies in cases where the state does not assert morality as a
justification for a classification: Colorado did not in Romer, and that has
not been the rationale asserted by defendants in any of the post-Romer
cases. One practical result of Romer may be that the types of legislation for
which morality can furnish a viable justification have been effectively
limited to criminal law.'47
Perhaps the biggest unknown is the extent to which Romer will play
any significant role in family law. Facially discriminatory statutes or
policies are common in the law of marriage and adoption. To date, courts
have not used Romer's proportionality principle to measure the sufficiency
of such asserted state interests as the protection of children, but instead
have found that a child-focused rationale provided adequate justification
for adverse treatment of lesbians and gay men.'4
147 Lawrence v. State, 2001 WL 265994 (Tex. App. 2001); Commonwealth v.
Paris, 1999 WL 1499542 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1999) (upholding sodomy law not limited
to same-sex partners).
14 1 See Weigand v. Houghton, 730 So. 2d 581, 593 (1999) (McRae, J., dis-
senting). Cf In re Adoption of T.K.J., 931 P.2d 488, 496 (1997) (no equal
protection violation in denying co-parent adoption on ground that lesbian partners
PROPORTIONAL EQUALITY
There are various reasons why Romer reasoning has been absent from
these cases. The only same-sex marriage case decided by an appellate court
since Romer was grounded in state law, and never reached an equal
protection analysis.' In cases involving denial of partner benefits or of
standing to bring a wrongful death claim, courts reasoned that the ground
of differentiation was marital status, not sexual orientation.' Under federal
equal protection principles, one must show that the discrimination alleged
was intentional; disparate impact claims are not cognizable."'
In the even larger category of custody and adoption cases, courts have
traditionally ruled based on the welfare of the child, rather than the rights
of a parent. In cases involving lesbian or gay parents, a number of courts
have permitted homosexual orientation to weigh against aparent only if the
opposing party can demonstrate a nexus between it and adverse effects on
the child. Other states, however, have ignored or rejected the nexus
requirement, reasoning that such harm was obvious and thereby subject to
judicial notice and to judicial discretion in the evaluation of its effect'
Romer has not figured in the analysis of courts reaching either outcome.
The obvious caveat to this point is that courts rarely consider the equal
protection aspects of any custody case. Other than Palmore v. Sidoti, 'gin
which the Supreme Court invalidated a custody determination based on the
were not married). In Zavaisky v. Anderson, 130 F. Supp. 2d 349 (D. Conn. 2001),
the court denied a motion to dismiss an equal protection claim made by the lesbian
partner of a mother whose child was placed in foster care. The partner alleged that
state officials had refused to consider her role in raising the child when ordering
the foster care placement, and then denied her visitation. Plaintiff alleged that she
would have been treated differently under the state's own internal policy had they
been a heterosexual couple. The court held that a conclusory assertion that the
action had lacked a rational basis could not survive a motion to dismiss decided in
light of the lenient rational basis test, but found that the allegation that the state
violated its own policy provided a sufficient ground to deny the motion to dismiss.
Id at 357.
149Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). The Hawaii marriage challenge was
mooted by an amendment of the state constitution limiting marriage to opposite-sex
partners. Baehr v. Miike, 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999) (summary disposition).
"' See, e.g., Bailey v. City of Austin, 972 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. App. 1998);
Rutgers Council of AAUP Chapter v. Rutgers, 689 A.2d 828 (1997).
' Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
5 See, e.g., Boswell v. Boswell, 721 A.2d 662 (Md. 1998); Knotts v. Knotts,
693 N.E.2d 962 (Ind. App. 1998); Inscoe v. Inscoe, 700 N.E.2d 70 (Ohio App.
1997).
1 See, e.g., Ex Parte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d 1190 (Ala. 1998).
' Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
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race of a parent's partner, custody law has generally provided that equal
protection principles are off the table. It is true that this principle renders
the silence as to Romer unsurprising. Yet it is also true that denial of child
custody based on sexual orientation is probably the single most brutal
penalty under law, short of actual incarceration, that can be (and frequently
is) visited on lesbian and gay Americans.
If we suspend for a moment what we know as lawyers about doctrinal
categories, the picture that emerges is of the family and its concomitant
status categories as an institution similar to the military in the extent to
which courts defer to the judgment of others, at least when the relevant
issue is sexual orientation. Thus, the development of the "gay family" as
both social reality and cultural perception is all the more important.'55
Indeed, widespread recognition of the concept ofa"gay family" contradicts
the reasoning of Bowers as powerfully as does the text of Romer. Emblem-
atic of the Bowers Court's approach was its language in distinguishing
previous privacy cases, finding "[n]o connection between family, marriage
and procreation on one handand homosexual sodomy on the other."'56 The
absence of equal protection reasoning in family law speaks less to doctrine
or the need for a doctrinal intervention, than to the embedded nature of
anti-gay social practices in the domestic realm.
CONCLUSION
Toni Massaro has called for lesbian and gay rights litigators to use
rational basis analysis because it is a "thin" doctrinal approach, providing
more openings for the use of reason and narrative and imposing fewer
doctrinal hurdles--such as satisfying the traditional criteria for suspect
classification-than the thicker approach of seeking heightened scrutiny. 5 '
I see Romer, as deployed by the lower courts in its f-st five years, as more
promising than simply thin. Indeed, it may prove to be neither thick nor
thin, but nonetheless extremely fertile.
"' See Jane S. Schacter, "Counted Among the Blessed": One Court and the
Constitution of Family, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1267 (1996).56 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986).
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